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This report presents an overview of practices on participation schemes in companies in different
European countries. It is based on a secondary analysis of the 1996 EPOC-mail survey data
among managers of profit-sector establishments in ten EU countries. The paper offers a
description of the diversity of the extent and nature of participative workplaces in European
countries. Hence, it analyses the interrelationships between several forms of participation
schemes and indicators for the participative nature of the workplace: schemes for direct
participation (DP) of employees, i.e. group consultation and individual and group delegation;
schemes for financial participation (FP), i.e. employee ownership and profit sharing; and the
arrangements for indirect, employee representative participation (ER). Based on a multivariate
analysis of the intensity of participation schemes, a profile of high participative workplaces is







Performance without a deliberate view on the contribution of involvement and
participation of employees appears to be outdated. High involvement and partnership to
meet global competition and demands on flexibility seems to be normal practice in
European companies or is debated in management-teams, at least according to much of
the management literature. However, there appears to exist a wide variety in forms of
participation and involvement schemes and practice appears not to follow theoretical
outlines and management-prescriptive literature. Moreover, there exists diversity in the
diffusion and use of different schemes between European countries. Practices in certain
countries appear to commit to schemes on participation by representatives; company-
practices in other countries appear to stress the importance of more direct participation
by way of, for instance, group work; and in other countries preferred practices focus on
employee ownership.
This article presents an overview of existing practices on participation schemes
in companies in different European countries. It analyses the interrelationships between
three forms of participation schemes: First, schemes for 	

(FP), i.e.




(DP) of employees, i.e. consultation and delegation; third  		ntation at
the establishment level. The paper discusses the interrelationship between these
practices and discusses interpretations of the existing diversity of practices between
companies in different European countries.  The central research question is: What is
the level of diffusion of participation practices in European countries and what explains
their existence?
This paper is based on a secondary analysis of survey data from the research
project Employee Participation in Organisational Change (EPOC) commissioned for
the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in
1996. The survey covers data from establishments in 10 European member states. Most
3of the questions concern the 	
 




implies that the analysis does focus on broad based schemes and not on management
and higher staff participation. Two types of financial participation schemes are included
in the analysis: share ownership and profit sharing. These forms of financial
participation are typical for the profit sector. Due to this we will exclude public sector
workplaces from the analysis.
In the next paragraph we present a general background for the phenomenon of
participation. After some introductory notes on the actual interest in the participation
theme, the conceptual framework of the research is presented, followed by definitions
of the various schemes. A short review of existing research literature is given that
highlights important variables that should be incorporated in the analysis. Paragraph 3
discusses the methodology of the EPOC Establishment Survey and sets out the focus of
the analysis. In paragraph 4 the results of the analyses are reported. The report
concludes by discussing the results.
At this place a word of warning: we present a 	 analysis of the EPOC.
The survey was conducted with a slightly different focus than the one we took for this
paper. This implies that the literature review comes up with important variables to be




In Europe the participation issue has always been an important aspect of organisation
and management in companies. Also, different European governments have
traditionally developed legislative arrangements to promote the involvement of
employees. Recently a shift towards the issue of direct participation away from the
more statutory indirect participation can be notified. Generally this shift is explained by
increased and more global competition and increased flexibility requirements. The
significance of direct participation is widely recognised by the social partners as the
4EPOC’s study of their views confirms (Regalia, 1995). This suggests, at the very least,
a shared industrial relations culture and, in some cases, increased co-operation between
the social partners.
Also on European level the issue of employee involvement and new forms of
work organisation is seen as a major step towards improved quality of production and
improved quality of working life as expressed by the European Commission’s Green
Paper 	
			
	 published in April 1997. The need
for direct participation in the organisation seems to become a ‘new conventional
wisdom’ (Osterman, 1994: p.173).
This conventional wisdom cannot be discovered for financial participation.
Although the European Commission has developed resolutions and studies to promote
this type of participation the spread and use in Europe is rather low (PEPPER II, 1996;
Poutsma and Huijgen, 1999). Recently a growth of management’ interest in increased
application of performance related remuneration as an involvement instrument has led
to an increase of experiments. One of the arguments for putting financial participation
into practice is to commit employees to the company and to develop an entrepreneurial
attitude. Of course, these arguments suggest an alignment with the reasons for putting
direct participation into practice. That is, direct participation is believed to enhance
involvement and commitment, to improve quality and productivity, to enhance the
competitiveness of enterprises. Indeed, participation is a key ingredient in management
strategies utilising ‘high commitment’ or ‘high involvement’ policies (Lawler, 1986).
To use popular buzzwords, the purpose of these policies is to ‘empower’ employees and
develop ‘high performance’ workplaces. In the course of these strategies there appears
strong evidence that employee share ownership, when combined with indirect and
direct participation does increase productivity. Put another way, employee share
ownership and participation (both direct and indirect, representative) tend to reinforce
each other (Jones and Pliskin, 1991; Poole and Jenkins, 1993; Logue and Yates, 1999).
In some instances this alignment of arguments for the different participation forms is
presented as the partnership company, which covers high participation practices on all
levels and all issues, i.e. the high involvement company.
5However, this alignment-argument is not without critics. Different types can
have quite different and conflicting objectives and functions. Financial participation
might aim at flexible profit related pay on an individual basis, while direct participation
might aim at improving the co-operation between workers. Also, indirect representative
participation might conflict with financial participation since the former mainly focuses
on collective solidarity and social justice in labour terms, while financial participation
tends to stress diversity and flexibility in rewards. Also the prevailing trend towards
more participation is questioned. In a review of the program of research on influence
sharing practices Heller (1999) concluded that organisational influence sharing appears
to have made only limited progress during the last 50 years.
In this paper we focus on the phenomenon of high participation practices.
Central questions are: What is the spread and use of different participation schemes in
Europe? What determines its existence? Are these practices somehow related to each
other, which could be denoted as ‘high participation practices’? What is the spread and
use of these high participation practices and what determines its existence?
Our study uses a conceptual model that focuses on the interrelationships of the
different types of participation. Figure 1 presents an overview of the various forms of
participation and the conceptual model used for the investigation. The survey allowed
for several indicators for these practices. Measures of intensity of participation were
possible especially for direct participation practices and to a lesser extent for employee
representative participation. Only for financial participation the indicator was limited to











In the mid 80’s several studies reported a "fundamental change regarding the use of
labour" within companies (Kern and Schumann, 1984).  Work rather than technology
was now regarded as the main factor in national and international competitiveness.
Most important, organisation was no longer seen as a measure to arrange work around
an existing technology, nor was work organisation only treated as a means for
humanisation and motivation. It was now considered the major factor to enhance
productivity and maintain competitiveness. Discussion of this 'paradigm change' in
























7Schumann.  This emphasised the role of human qualifications and direct participation in
the production process and generated the term ’Neue Produktionskonzepte’ (New
Production Concepts).
In the Netherlands and Sweden parallel to this discussion and partly inspired by
new production concepts much work organisation research and literature was focused
on sociotechnical design. In 1981 Dutch scientist De Sitter published a book on
Swedish experiences with group work. In the following years a series of design
practices started in both the Netherlands and Sweden.
The MIT-study of Womack, Jones and Roos (1990) looked at different versions
of New Production Concepts in the car industry. The authors compared Japanese
automotive factories with European and US car companies and identified that the
Japanese style of production organisation (’Toyotism’) was much more efficient in that
it achieved car production in half the time, half the space and with half of the costs.
The authors attributed this efficiency lead not to the use of advanced technology but to
the new forms of work organisation that pervade the whole firm, i.e. ‘Just-in-Time
systems’ and ‘teams’.  The public and scientific debate on teams following this study
can be taken as one origin of the EPOC project, and various hypotheses, questions and
expectations deriving from the debate went into the conceptual approach of the EPOC
project on participation. Team-based work and empowerment appear to be major issues
in recent management concepts (see for an overview Fröhlich & Pekruhl, 1996)

		
From an historical perspective, industrial democracy was much more important in most
European countries throughout this century, whereas the first wave in economic
democracy is present only in the 1980’s.  Indeed, most European countries have
experienced some form of employee participation in decision making, whether through
works councils or co-determination on company boards, which has also been enhanced
by EU’s active promotion of industrial democracy.  On the contrary, forms of economic
democracy have, until the 1980’s, been limited in extent, and it is only in the past




Taking a contingency perspective and given the empirical research on motives and
effects it is expected that both direct participation and financial participation is
important for those companies that face dynamic environments, that have to compete on
quality and variety. This environment is reflected in organic structures with greater task
interdependence and required flexibility due to greater variety in products and services.
Scarcity on labour markets tends also to enhance the use of these schemes to commit
employees to the company and the company’s objectives. This holds especially for
qualified professionals in knowledge-intensive service industries. Employee
representation tends to develop along legislative arrangements and is more found in
larger workplace and in places where unions have a role to play. It is less found in
young, small growing companies. In addition financial participation schemes are more
often found in young growing firms and less applied for employees with labour terms
bound by collective labour agreements, these were found to be implemented for higher
qualified professionals and commercial personnel, these were found to a lesser degree
in companies with substantive degrees of unionism and more often seen as a
remuneration instrument for staff and management, these were not found in
independent family owned companies but are more established in larger public
companies listed on stock markets (see for an overview of the different contingencies:
Heller et al. 1998; Fröhlich & Pekruhl 1996; Sisson 1996; Mol, Meihuizen & Poutsma,
1997; OECD 1995; Lammers & Szell 1989; Poole & Jenkins 1990; Poutsma & Van
den Tillaart 1996).
One of the important internal influences shaping participation is the range of
values and beliefs, and strategies held by the actors involved. These actors include the
managers, individual employees, workgroups and their representatives who are
involved in the decision-making process of the organisation and the bodies concerned
with participation (Cf. Long, 1982; Mygind and Rock, 1993, Cotton, 1993).
Participation is more developed in organisation where management is convinced of the







With respect to the influence of the institutional and legal context the European
countries do exhibit varying levels of interest and qualitatively different legislative
programmes, regarding direct participation, employee representative participation 
financial participation. The statutory structures of the Federal Republic of Germany,
and the Works Council legislation in the Netherlands can be contrasted with the more
voluntary systems in the United Kingdom, Italy and Ireland. The elaborate
arrangements on financial participation in the UK and France can be contrasted with the
almost non-existence of governmental regulations and provisions in Denmark, Sweden,
Italy and Spain (cf. the PEPPER reports). In France the implementation of a profit
sharing system is even mandatory for companies with more than 50 employees.
More specifically research on direct participation and new technologies shows
a variation of methods and schemes of participation as great within each country as the
variation between countries (Cressey & Williams 1990). However, certainly some
legislation particularly of the supportive and non-regulatory type - may favour
participation in Europe. Recently the phenomenon of privatisation has had an important
impact on the growth of share-ownership in the whole of Europe, for instance in the
UK, France, Italy and Spain. Hence, multinational companies face difficulties to
transnationalise their participation schemes and ask for more support on European level.
Employee share ownership schemes are part of corporate governance systems
with a greater emphasis on participation by employees. Again, discussions and
(conflicting) interests on this topic within corporate governance systems will influence
the existence and diffusion of these schemes. Again, given the differences in corporate
governance systems within Europe, it is to be expected that divergence rather than
convergence will be the outcome in the way these schemes are implemented in different
European countries. In our analyses of the differences in dissemination of schemes we
will use a typology of corporate governance systems developed by Weimer & Pape
(1999). Weimer and Pape(1999) distinguish four models of corporate governance (see
table 1) . The criteria for classification involves several factors of which the most
important ones are: the role and position of the state, financial systems and institutions,
the influence of employees and their representatives, ownership and control-structures
10
and performance related behaviour of management. Scheme 2 summarises the
characteristics of the four models (Broekhof, 1999) and includes typical countries.
Scheme 2
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Source: Weimer and Pape (1999), moderation by Broekhof (1999) and authors
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Not only at the level of national industrial relations and corporate governance systems
we touch upon substantial differences. Research carried out by Hofstede (1980),
Maurice et al. (1982), Gallie (1983), Sorge & Warner (1987), Hampden-Turner &
Trompenaars (1993), Lessem & Neubauer (1994), Gatley (1996) and many others, has
shown that the way in which organisations in a country are structured and managed is
strongly influenced by national specific social and cultural factors in such a manner that
one can even speak of societal patterns of management and organisations (Lane, 1989).
Despite differences encountered in companies within the same country there is
nevertheless a specific recognisable societal pattern that emerges between countries.
This implies that also the employment relationship in companies is influenced by
national specific social and cultural factors. Within this perspective it is to be expected
that workers and employers in different countries will have a different attitude towards
participation in general and towards financial participation in particular (Poutsma,
Benders, Van Hootegem en De Nijs, 1996). Whereas American managers tend to
assume the link between variable pay and corporate performance (given their cultural
inclination towards short-term performance measures), European managers (given their
cultural rejection of short-termism) need to be convinced of the connection, preferring
to proceed in a direction that reflects their ‘may be’ and  ‘in certain organisations’
philosophy (Sparrow and Hiltrop, 1994, pp. 517). In his comparative study on variable
executive rewards systems Pennings (1993) gives the following quotation of a Dutch
manager with respect to his view on the link between remuneration and performance. “
We don’t believe in it. Even profit-sharing pay-outs are fixed and can be found in the
budget. We would not allow the polishing of results to boost a pay-out. Profits are due
to a lot of factors, depreciation, setting of replacement value and so forth.... We differ
from the U.S., where historical prices induce people to focus on short-term profits, so
that their business becomes very cyclical. People cannot wait five, ten years before they
get the results on the basis of which they are paid..... We let the people grow with the
business. Their best reward is promotion”  (pp, 271-272).
Based on the foregoing short description of literature and the available data we
distinguished in our analysis the following contextual variables divided into two
categories: global characteristics and conditional factors. The global characteristics
include country (including dummy variables for corporate governance and culture), size
12
of the workplace, sector and the occupational groups that make use of the participation
schemes. Conditional factors include the scope of competition, ownership, labour terms
bound by collective labour agreement or not, percentage union-membership, degree of
innovation, management attitudes towards participation, employment growth, and
qualification-level of the workforce
-'($,
! $
The data used here were collected for the EPOC survey (EPOC Research Group 1997)
that was commissioned by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions. The main purpose of the EPOC survey (Employee direct
Participation in Organisational Change) was to establish the incidence of different
forms of direct employee participation in different countries. A mail survey directed at
the (general) manager of a sample of establishments was used to collect information on
workplaces in ten European countries: Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. For larger countries (France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK) the gross sample was 5000 workplaces; for medium
sized countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden) it was 2500 and for the smaller
countries (Ireland, Portugal) it was 1000. As is often the case for mail surveys, the
response was not very high. The overall response rate was almost 18 percent, varying
between 9 percent (Spain) and 39 percent (Ireland). It is not out of line, however, with
comparable cross-national postal surveys of Price Waterhouse Cranfield (PWC)
(Brewster and Hegewisch, 1994) and Harzing (1997). The overall return rates of usable
questionnaires were 17 and 20 per cent, respectively, which is close to the EPOC
response rate. The total number of respondents was 5786. Due to our interest in share
ownership and profit sharing we focused on the profit sector, leaving data for analysis
on little more than 4,600 establishments.
The EPOC survey was restricted to establishments with at least 50 employees
in the non-agricultural sector and was stratified by firm size and sector. Larger firms
were over sampled, as were firms in the construction sectors, whereas firms in the
services sector and industries were under sampled. To take this into account,
13
appropriate weights based on sector, firm size, and country were used to make the data
representative for a selection of European countries.
.(%
In the analyses below, we will examine factors influencing the occurrence of financial
participation, direct participation, and employee representation. In measuring financial
participation, we can distinguish two dimensions, 	
	 and 		.
Dummy variables were constructed on the basis of questions 20, “Please indicate if
employees in the largest occupational group are eligible for membership of the
following:” with “profit sharing schemes”, “share ownership schemes”, and “none of
the above” as responses.
Direct participation was measured by creating an index using questions 24c,
24d, and 28a. Question 24c asked “Has the management given INDIVIDUAL non-
managerial employees in the largest occupational group the right to make DECISIONS
on how their own work is performed without reference to immediate manager for one
or more of the following?” Question 24d asked “Has the management given to formally
introduced GROUPS the right to make DECISIONS on how their work is performed on
a GROUP basis without reference to immediate manager for one or more of the
following?” Question 28a asked “On what issues and how often are the views of
employees in the largest occupational group sought on a GROUP basis?” Each question
had 8 items 1relating to direct participation. An index was created of the number of
affirmative responses to questions 24c and 24d and responses of “regularly” to 28a.
Firms with 10 to 24 affirmative responses were held to have direct participation in the
                                               
1
 The 8 items for question 24c were: scheduling of work, quality of product or service,
improving work processes, dealing with ‘internal’ customers’, dealing with external
clients, time keeping, attendance, working conditions. The 8 items for question 24d were:
allocation of work, scheduling of work, quality of work, time keeping, attendance and
absence control, job rotation, coordination of work with other internal groups, improving
work processes. The 8 items for question 28a were: work organisation, working time,
health & safety, training & development, quality of product or service, group performance,
customer relations, changes in technology, changes in investment. The items for questions
24c and 24d had “yes” and “no”
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bivariate analyses. In the multivariate analysis, the direct participation index was
recoded into 4 categories: 0, 1 to 3, 4 to 9, and 10 to 24 forms of direct participation.
Employee representation was based on question 21. This asked “Are there any
of the following REPRESENTATIVES of the employees in the largest occupational
group recognised for the purposes of consultation/negotiation and or joint decision
making at this workplace?”. The dummy for employee representation receives a 1 if
firms answered affirmatively to one or more of the following three responses: trade
union representatives, representatives elected to a works council, representatives to an
advisory committee established by management. There are, of course differences
between country in the nature and extent of representative bodies. With this procedure
we prevent this problem and subsequently in the analysis we controlled for country.
The variables for profit sharing, share ownership, direct participation, and
employee representation formed the basic dependent variables in our analyses. In
addition, we constructed three combined measures of high financial, direct, and
representative participation. 	

 was defined as either profit sharing or
share ownership, plus direct participation, plus employee representation. 
	
	 was defined as share ownership, plus direct participation, plus employee
representation.  	

 was defined as high participation plus at least limited
joint decision making, as measured by the fourth item of question 62. Question 62
asked, “To what extent were employee REPRESENTATIVES informed, consulted,
involved in negotiations, or joint decision making about the introduction of the most
important practice of participation?” There were 4 items, “informed”, “consulted”,
“involved in negotiations”, “involved in joint decision making”, with responses
“extensively”, “limited”, and “not at all”.
/	 
4.1 Bivariate analyses
First bivariate analyses show some expected interrelationships. Table 1 contains the
Pearson correlations among the different types of participation. There are significant
correlations between profit sharing and the three other types, and between share
15
ownership and direct participation. Only employee representative participation does not
associate with share ownership and direct participation which suggests at least question
marks concerning the alignment argument and wide spread existence of the
combination of participation forms.
Table 1 Correlations between different types of participation





share ownership .165** 1
direct participation .105** .053** 1
employee representation .089** -.018 .007 1
Table 2 presents a further insight into the combination of participation forms. Direct
participation is split into three types of intensity of direct participation: individual
delegation, group consultation and group delegation (i.e. teamwork). Intensity includes
an index of the number of issues of which the views of employees is sought.
From this analysis it appears that for 	
 	 management attitude
towards participation plays also a role. Management’s opinion that Direct Participation
is important for competitiveness correlates with the existence of financial participation
schemes. Hence it appears that a high level of group delegation, i.e. teamwork in the
organisation contributes to profit sharing and that employee representation must be
available.
For 		it appears that high individual delegation contributes to
its existence. While the bi-variate association suggest that there is no relationship
between employee representative participation and share ownership is this regression
analysis employee representation doe contribute to the existence of share ownership.
This fits the theoretical perspectives of monitoring agents with delegates tasks and of
the longer term arrangements of commitment to company objectives via the
involvement of employee representatives.
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Table 2 Summary results of selected variables in a logistic regression model for profit
sharing and share ownership (including other selected independent variables; see text)
profit sharing Share ownership





no answer -.21* -.26*




















* significant at .05




In this paragraph we present a brief insight into contextual and enterprise







"The analysis is bivariate since
the numbers are very low. Table 3a shows the independent variables used in these
analyses and the percentage of occurrence of each type of  participation. The
sample was limited to firms in the profit sector. In addition, we omitted Portugal due
to the fact that no information was available on fiscal and ownership policies in this
country for the analysis of country effects below. A single asterisk indicates that the
variable has a significant bivariate association2 with the type of participation in
question at a 5% level of significance, two asterisks indicates a significant association
at a 1% level. The chi-square values on which these are based are presented in table
3b.
< table 3a about here >
< table 3b about here >
0
High participation entails either profit sharing or share ownership, together with both
direct participation and employee representation. This combination occurs in only 4.5%
of the firms. Country has a significant impact, with a very high rate for France (due to
the high numbers of mandatory profit sharing arrangements) and negligible numbers in
Italy, Spain and Ireland (3, 4 and 6 unweighted cases respectively, with only 8 in
Denmark as well). Sector, size and work type have no significant impact. High
participation is more likely in highly competitive firms. Independent or international
                                               
2
 The bivariate associations in table 3a between independent variables and types of
participation are based on the Wald Chi-square of a logit model in Stata using population
weighting and robust standard errors (StataCorp 1999). Since the data are based on a
stratified sample, the usual likelihood ratio chi-square cannot be used here.
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ownership does not affect high participation. High participation is more likely if the
establishment is bound by a collective agreement. Unionisation does not have a
significant impact.  A high qualification level, somewhat innovative climate, and
importance of direct participation increase the likelihood of high participation, but
employee growth has no significant impact.
0
High partnership means share ownership plus direct participation and employee
representation. This combination occurs in only 1.8% of the firms. This percentage
varies significantly by country, with the UK as the country where it is by far most
prevalent, with a percentage more than twice that of second place, France. None of the
Italian firms met the criterion of high partnership, and there was only 1 unweighted case
in Ireland 3 in Sweden, 4 in Denmark, 5 in Spain. High partnership is not affected by
sector. The relationship with size is significant but complicated. High partnership is
most likely in the largest firms with more than 500 employees (possibly due to listed
stock exchange companies), but very unlikely in small to medium sized firms, with 50-
99 employees. This could be affected by small numbers, i.e. there are only 4 and 5
unweighted cases respectively in the first two size categories. Other than this, the
independent variables used here do not affect high partnership.


Firms with top participation fulfil the criteria for high participation and have at least
limited joint decision making as well. Only 56 firms or 1.5% of the sample fulfilled
these criteria. There are significant differences among countries, with higher
percentages in France, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. The Netherlands and
Denmark form a middle category. Top participation is rare in Germany and Spain and
does not occur in Ireland or Italy.
Top participation is not affected by sector or size. It occurs almost entirely for
commercial type of work and does not occur at all for administrative or clerical work
types. Top participation is not significantly affected by intensity of competition. It is
more likely if the ownership is independent but is not significantly affected by
19
international ownership. A collective agreement does not have a significant impact but
the absence of unionisation makes top participation more likely. Top participation is
also more likely for top qualification levels, but is not affected by technical innovation,
employment growth, or whether direct participation affects competitiveness.
4.2 Determinant factors for types of participation; multivariate
analyses
In this section, we examine the effects of the independent variables on the types of
participation while controlling for the others. This will only be possible for the four core
dependent variables, profit sharing, share ownership, direct participation and employee
representation. The combined measures for high participation, high partnership, and top
participation do not occur frequently enough to allow valid inferences from a
multivariate model.
Since profit sharing, share ownership, and employee representation are
dichotomous, they are analysed using logistic regression. These models treat the
predicted probability of the type of participation occurring as a non-linear function of
the independent variables. Positive parameters indicate that the category in question of
an independent variable increases the probability of participation occurring, negative
parameters mean it decreases this probability. The rate of change however will depend
on the position on the probability curve (Long 1997).
Direct participation has four categories (0, 1 to 3, 4 to 9, and 10 to 24 forms of
direct participation) and was analysed using an ordered logit model. This model looks at
the probability of higher versus lower scores. The model produces a different intercept
but the same parameters for the probability of categories 2 or higher, 3 or higher, or
category 4. Other than this the interpretation is the same as for logistic regression of a
dichotomous dependent variable.
As can be inferred from table 3a and 3b, many of the independent variables had
a number of missing cases. List wise deletion would lead to an unacceptably low
number of valid cases. Instead, we included missing values as a separate category. The
deviation contrast was used for the independent variables, i.e. the constraint that
parameters sum to zero. A significant effect for the category “missing” will indicate that
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missing cases are not random but tend to be composed more of certain categories than
of others. It is of course preferable that the category “missing” be non-significant but at
least this procedure ensures that the parameter estimates are based on as large a sample
as possible. Since the data are from a stratified sample, the analysis was performed on a
weighted data set. Many datasets use weights to compensate for unequal sampling
probabilities due to a stratified sampling design and/or poststratification to correct for
departures from known population frequency distributions. Some researchers do not use
these weights in regression procedures, but this produces biased estimates. If the
weights are used in a standard fashion, the coefficients are unbiased but their standard
errors are too low (Lohr 1999). Instead, we analysed a weighted dataset but used the
“pweight” option in Stata to procure robust standard errors (StataCorp 1999), which do
take unequal sampling probabilities into account.
The estimation procedure produced robust standard errors that take the
sampling design into account. As a consequence, chi-square statistics reported below
are based on Wald statistics rather than likelihood ratio values.

Table 4 shows the parameter estimates for the effects of the independent variables on
the participation variables. Asterisks beside the variable’s name indicate the
significance of the variable as a whole but ignoring a category for missing cases if
present. The chi-square values for each of the model terms can be found in table 4
below.
< table 4 about here >
The parameters show that profit sharing is significantly more prevalent in France (due
to mandatory regulations and state promotion) and the UK (due to favourable tax
regulations and promotion), and significantly less prevalent in Italy, Spain, and Ireland,
while the remaining countries are average. Unlike the bivariate analyses, there are no
significant effects of sector. As in the bivariate analyses, there are no significant effects
of firm size and work type. A low intensity of competition however does lower the
likelihood of profit sharing taking place. Independent ownership (most probably closely
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held family firms) significantly decreases the likelihood of profit sharing but
international ownership and missing ownership status have no significant effects. A
collective agreement and unionisation have no significant effects, but no employee
representation makes profit sharing less likely while a high qualification level,
employee growth, and a perceived impact of direct participation on competitiveness
makes it more likely. In conclusion, growing companies with high-qualified workforce
and where management stress the importance of direct participation for competitiveness
are more likely to have profit sharing arrangements as well.
!
The parameters for share ownership show that this is predominantly a British affair, as
was found in the bivariate analyses. Sector has no significant effects but share
ownership does become more likely as firm size increases. This is in line with the
expectation that larger companies tend also to be publicly listed companies. There are
no significant effects of work type or intensity of competition. Both independent
ownership and international ownership of the establishment make share ownership less
likely. A collective agreement and unionisation have no significant effects but
employee representation, and higher qualification levels increase the likelihood of share
ownership. Technical innovation and employee growth have no significant effects and
the only effect of the impact of direct participation on competitiveness is that of the
missing category. The negative parameter indicates that firms with no share ownership
tended not to answer this question.
.
Direct participation was treated as an ordered categorical variable in these analyses.
Parameters indicate the effect of an independent variable on the log odds of a higher
versus a lower score, regardless of where the cut point for “high” versus “low” is
placed. There parameters show that the Netherlands, Ireland, and the UK are more
likely to have higher levels of direct participation, whereas in Spain in particular as well
as in Italy this likelihood is much lower. The parameter for the construction sector is
significantly negative although sector as a whole is not significant. Likewise, firm size
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does not have a significant effect although higher levels of direct participation tend to
become less likely as size increases, significantly so for the second to largest category.
If the largest occupational group is active in the production/transportation field of work
then higher levels of direct participation are also less likely. Higher levels of direct
participation become more likely as the intensity of competition increases. There are no
significant effects of independent or international ownership but a missing ownership
status does make have a significant positive effect. This effect is difficult to interpret.
Collective agreements do not have a significant effect but employee representation
does. Unionisation has no impact but higher qualification levels, little technical
innovation and a perceived effect of direct participation on competitiveness increase the
likelihood of higher levels of direct participation. Employee growth also has a
significant impact on direct participation, although none of the individual parameters
are significant.
#$
The effects of country on employee representation show that it is more likely to occur
in France and Spain and less likely in Denmark. Employee representation is also less
likely in the construction sector and more likely in larger firms. Work type, intensity of
competition and ownership have no significant effects. A collective agreement
increases the likelihood of employee representation and unionisation has an extremely
strong impact. Qualification levels, innovation, and employee growth do not
significantly affect employee representation, but employee representation is
significantly less likely if it is not felt that direct participation affects competitiveness.
Table 5 shows the chi-square values for each of the terms in the models. As
noted above, the category “missing” has been ignored when calculating these values.
The largest values, ignoring the associated degrees of freedom, tend to be for country.
There are also strong effects of unionisation and firm size on employee representation.
All other chi-square values tend to be a good deal smaller. The second to last row of
table 5 shows the total significance of the model, excluding country. The largest value
by far is for employee representation, primarily due to the strong effects of unionisation
and work type. The last row of table 5 shows the total association, including country
and the “missing” categories. The strongest chi-square value is for profit sharing due to
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the strong effects of country on that variable. However, the chi-square for employee
representation is only slightly lower whereas the model for this variable has two
degrees of freedom less than the others.
Table 5









Country 8 210.3** 63.9** 84.6** 52.8**
Sector 3 3.9 2.9 5.2 10.1*
Firm size 4 1.5 19.2** 8.7 65.4**
Work type 5 2.6 1.7 11.2* 2.8
Intensity of competition 2 6.4* .9 7.1* 1.0
Independent ownership 1 13.7** 9.4** .1 3.3
International ownership 1 .6 9.0** 1.9 .5
Collective agreement 1 .3 1.5 .2 18.4**
Employee representation 1 14.2** 7.2** 16.8**
Degree of unionisation 3 7.3 2.8 1.4 132.4**
Qualification level 2 7.8* 9.3** 27.2** 1.5
Technical innovation 3 3.5 1.3 20.9** .6
Employee growth 2 9.5** 1.9 11.0** 1.5
Dir. Particip. & competitiven. 1 7.5** .0 36.7** 9.8**
Association, excl. country1 29 103.14** 84.2** 187.0** 325.2**
Total association2 45 406.4** 207.2** 289.3** 404.5**
The missing values category, where applicable, has not been included except for the
chi-square value for “total association”
1
“Employee representation” as a dependent variable has 28 df for “association,
excluding country
2
“Employee representation” as a dependent variable has 43 df for “total association”
 $
Since country has an important impact on the spread and use of participation schemes
we wanted to include dummy variables to try to find out what is behind this rather
complex variable. In the theoretical part we mentioned a number of factors that could
account for the differences between countries. Most important are government policies
and legislative arrangements ( as an expression of national culture and institutions),
corporate governance differences, different industrial relations systems and business
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cultures. We tried to classify the countries according to characteristics of these systems
and arrangements. It must be noted that this is a first rough test. It should be possible to
have more refined indicators for country characteristics. The classification of country is
mainly based on Weimar and Pape, 1999 and the PEPPER II Report. Table 6 shows
five groupings of countries into two categories and one grouping into three, North
European, West European, and South European.
Table 6


















France X x x S
Germany X x N
Ireland X x W
Italy x S
Netherlands x x N
Spain x S
Sweden x N
UK X x x W
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Table 7
Model fit and percentage of possible model fit for the six groupings of countries




chi2 pct chi2 pct chi2 pct chi2 pct
Favourable tax
policy shares
7 162.4** 22.8% 60.2** 5.7% 48.5** 42.7% 52.6** .3%
Favourable tax
policy profit sharing
7 73.5** 65.0% 43.0** 32.7% 64.5** 23.7% 36.1** 31.7%
Concentration of
ownership high
7 206.6** 1.8% 54.1** 15.3% 49.5** 41.5% 43.5** 17.6%
Importance of stock
market
7 198.7** 5.5% 33.2** 48.0% 70.7** 16.4% 48.2** 8.8%
Employee influence 7 190.2** 9.5% 59.3** 7.2% 78.0** 7.8% 37.0** 29.9%
Cultural climate 6 188.9** 10.2% 32.9** 48.5% 45.1** 46.7% 37.0** 30.0%
Total effects of
country
8 210.3** 63.9** 84.6** 52.8**
Table 7 shows the results of tests that the effects of country as found in tables 3a , b and
4 correspond with the country groupings given in table 6. These tests examine whether
parameters for country are equal within each group but differ between groups. These
tests have 1 df, or in the case of cultural climate, 2 df less than the usual test for the
significance of the term, which ascertains whether all 8 parameters are equal to zero.
The lower the chi-square values for the test, the greater the homogeneity of the
parameters for country within the groupings. In order to ascertain the overall
performance, we also express this as the percentage reduction relative to the total
effects of country as given in the last row. This percentage is equal to 1 - chi2/chi2total
The effects of country on profit sharing can be best grouped according to
“favourable tax policy profit sharing”, which reduces the chi-square by 65%. Cultural
climate leads to the largest chi-square reduction for share ownership, but “importance
of stock market” performs almost as well and is more parsimonious. Cultural climate
also leads to the greatest reduction for direct participation but, taking degrees of
freedom into account, “favourable tax policy shares” is preferable. For employee
representation, “favourable tax policy profit sharing”, “employee influence” and
“cultural climate” are important factors.
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Table 8 summarises the results of this paper. It presents an overview of the most
important positive and negative contributors to the type of participation and includes
also the impact of country characteristics.
	
	appears to be a tax driven instrument. These schemes are more
implemented in France and the UK. You find these schemes in companies that have a
high-qualified workforce and that experienced employment growth. Management
agrees that direct participation is important for competitiveness and tends to organise
work via group delegation. Profit sharing is not likely in Italy and Spain and in
independent single firms with no employee representation, low direct participation and
low competitive environments.
#		appears to be driven by cultural climate and the importance of
stock market in a country. It tends to be concentrated in the UK. You find these
schemes in larger companies with a high-qualified workforce. These companies have
employee representative participation and the work is more individually delegated.
Share ownership is not likely in medium sized, independent single firms with a low
qualified workforce. Slightly unexpected, also internationally owned companies tend




is driven by cultural climate in a country and tends to be
found in the Netherlands and Ireland. Companies that implements direct participation
are innovative and have high-qualified employees. They face more intense competition
and management view is that direct participation is important for competitiveness.
Direct participation is not likely in Spain and Italy. Direct participation is not likely in
production and transport sector and the typical non-participative company has no
employee representative, low qualified workforce, faces low competition and is not






 is driven by the cultural climate and
institutionalised employee influence and found more in France and Spain. It is found in
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larger unionised establishment where labour terms are bound by collective agreements.
On the other hand employee representative participation is obviously not found in
smaller, less or non-unionised workplaces without collective labour agreements.
Management also disagree with the importance of direct participation for
competitiveness. Employee representative participation on establishment level is not
common in Denmark.




	 in Europe. Although there are important associations
between the different types of participation the survey makes clear that the phenomenon
of high participation is rare. Less than 5 % of European establishments combine the
types of participation into what might be called the high participative workplace. As far
as it is possible to analyse these small number of observations the results tend to
support the expectation that high participation is the environment for the high-qualified
workforce in companies that face high competition and wants to be innovative.
At this stage we would like to  reflect critically on the survey. This paper
presents results of a secondary analysis of the EPOC data. This of course implies that
certain important factors that might be important for the phenomena under investigation
were not  clearly defined in the survey or was introduced in the analysis by rough
indicators. On the other hand the survey had enough substance to provide us with the
most important ones. Also the information on certain dependent variables was limited
especially on financial participation.
Important is to note that this survey made an inventory of management views
on participation. It was right that the survey asked for objective formal provisions as an
indicator for participation next to opinions of management about participation. We tried
to include more objective indicators as much as possible. The focus on formal schemes
might underestimate the phenomenon of participation on the one hand since there will
be informal participation that is not covered by the survey. On the other hand the survey
does not allow assessing the level of influence of employees, which is of course the
core of participation. Also our own definition of profit sharing as a type of participation
may be questioned. We may conclude from the results of this survey that profit sharing
28
is a tax driven phenomenon that most probably has nothing to do with participation. We
may suggest excluding profit sharing from the participation debate.
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Table 8 Summary of results of most important positive and negative contributors to type of participation
	





 ++ -- ++ -- ++ -- ++ --
Sector Construction
Firm size >199 100-199 >199 <100
Work occupation Production /
transport
Intensity of competition low Medium /
high
low
Independent single firm Yes Yes
Internationally owned Yes
Collective labour agreement Yes No
Employee representation No Yes No
Degree of unionisation >29% <30%
Qualification level high high low high low
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Table 8 Summary of results of most important positive and negative contributors to type of participation
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Direct participation important for
competitiveness













. favourable tax policy profit
sharing
. favourable tax policy shares
. concentration of ownership high
. importance of stock market






















Affirmative (%) 4.5% 1.8% 1.5%
Affirmative (N) 172 71 56
Total N 3834 3834 3834
Country ** ** *
Denmark 2.7% 1.4% 1.7%
France 13.0% 2.3% 3.4%
Germany 2.3% 1.1% .4%
Ireland .9% .2% –
Italy .5% – –
Netherlands 2.9% 1.6% 2.0%
Spain .9% .9% .1%
Sweden 5.7% .2% 2.8%
United Kingdom 6.9% 4.9% 2.9%
Sector
industry 3.4% 1.3% .8%
Construction 3.8% 1.7% 1.5%
trade 6.6% 3.0% 3.3%
services 4.5% 1.7% .6%
Size of establishment **
-49 4.5% 2.8% 3.2%
50-99 3.8% .7% .6%
100-199 4.9% 2.1% 1.7%
200-499 4.4% 1.8% .8%
500 + 6.9% 4.3% 1.2%
Work type *
Production/transportation 3.5% 1.4% .8%
Commercial 7.8% 4.7% 5.3%
repair/technical 3.5% 1.0% .9%
personal services 7.0% 2.9% .5%
Admin/clerical 11.1% .8% –
other 1.7% .6% .5%
Intensity of competition **
low 1.7% .9% .7%
Medium 5.2% 2.7% 2.4%
high 6.3% 1.7% 1.1%
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no 4.9% 1.7% .6%
yes 4.0% 2.0% 2.3%
International ownership
no 4.5% 1.9% 1.6%
yes 4.2% 1.5% .6%
Collective agreement? *
yes 5.2% 2.0% 1.9%
no 2.2% .9% .4%
Degree of unionisation *
no union members 6.6% 2.6% 3.1%
1-30 3.9% 1.7% .4%
30-69 3.3% 1.3% .7%
70-100 4.0% 1.9% 1.6%
Qualification level * *
low 2.7% 1.5% .6%
Medium 2.8% 1.6% .5%
high 7.2% 2.7% 2.6%
Technical innovation *
none 2.3% 1.3% 1.2%
Very little 4.8% 2.0% 1.7%
little 5.5% 2.0% 1.5%
Medium/intense 5.9% 2.2% 1.3%
Employment growth
Increased 5.6% 1.0% 1.2%
same 4.6% 2.9% 2.0%
Reduced 3.6% 1.7% 1.2%
Dir. Particip. & competitiven. *
agree 6.5% 2.6% 2.2%
Disagree 2.2% 1.2% .8%
* sign. <0.05  ** <0.01
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Table 3B
Bivariate chi-square association between independent variables and different types of participation
high participation high partnership top participation
chi2 df N chi2 df N Chi2 df N
Country 53.0** 8 3834 22.1** 7 3433 14.9* 6 3169
Sector 2.6 3 3834 1.7 3 3834 6.0 3 3834
Firm size 4.3 4 3834 14.1** 4 3834 5.3 4 3834
Work type 10.5 5 3834 7.2 5 3834 9.5* 4 3608
Intensity of competition 11.2** 2 3467 2.9 2 3467 2.6 2 3467
Independent ownership 0.3 1 3834 0.1 1 3834 5.9* 1 3834
International ownership 0.0 1 3834 0.3 1 3834 2.3 1 3834
Collective agreement 6.1* 1 3661 2.4 1 3661 3.3 1 3661
Degree of unionisation 2.1 3 3605 0.7 3 3605 9.9* 3 3605
Qualification level 8.5* 2 3123 0.9 2 3123 6.5* 2 3123
Technical innovation 8.5* 3 3834 1.3 3 3834 0.2 3 3834
Employment growth 1.5 2 3720 3.8 2 3720 0.4 2 3720
Dir. particip. & competitiven. 5.7* 1 3164 1.1 1 3164 2.1 1 3164
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Table 4










Country ** ** ** **
Denmark -.11 .43 -.24 -1.50**
France 1.84** -.31 .32 .81**
Germany -.19 -.28 .20 -.22
Ireland -.53* .07 .47** -.28
Italy -1.45** -.67 -.53** -.17
Netherlands -.19 -.47 .57** .17
Spain -1.24** .40 -1.22** .58*
Sweden .49 -1.15 .11 .21
United Kingdom 1.38** 1.98** .31* .41
Sector *
Industry -.18 -.13 -.03 .23
Construction -.14 -.20 -.27* -.39*
trade .24 .47 .16 .26
Services .08 -.14 .14 -.09
Firm size ** **
-49 -.20 -.46 .25 -1.16**
50-99 .09 .03 .16 -.33*
100-199 -.02 -.50* -.07 -.10
200-499 .06 .39* -.23* .53**
500 + .08 .54** -.10 1.06**
Work type *
production/transportation .13 .27 -.35** .20
Commercial .12 -.04 .24 -.01
repair/technical -.07 -.16 -.11 -.09
personal services .16 .10 .35 -.17
admin/clerical -.10 -.14 .04 .14
other -.24 -.03 -.16 -.07
Intensity of competition * *
low -.33* .00 -.25* -.06
Medium .22 .20 .17* .13
high .14 -.01 .19* .19
Missing -.04 -.19 -.12 -.26
Independent ownership -.66** -.77** .03 -.33
International ownership -.16 -.86** .25 -.23
Ownership status missing -.48 -.46 .58* -.40
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yes -.24 .33 .02 .41*
no -.12 -.12 .09 -.58**
Missing .35 -.20 -.12 .17
Employee representation ** ** **
no -.61** -.33 -.37**
yes .25 .51* .24*
Missing .36 -.18 .14
Degree of unionisation **
no union members .18 .43 .15 -1.53**
1-30 .19 .15 .02 -.46**
30-69 -.29 -.25 -.06 .54**
70-100 -.39 -.17 .03 1.72**
Missing .31 -.17 -.14 -.27
Qualification level * ** **
low -.17 -.48* -.46** .25
Medium -.12 .37 .10 -.10
high .35** .49** .39** -.01
Missing -.05 -.38 -.03 -.14
Technical innovation **
none -.26 .14 -.39** -.01
Very little .02 -.09 -.13 .07
little .08 -.13 .22* -.10
medium/intense .16 .08 .30* .03
Employee growth ** **
Increased .53** .20 .20 -.20
same .02 -.15 .01 -.16
Reduced .03 -.09 -.26 .08
Missing -.58 .04 .05 .28
Dir. particip. & competitiven. ** ** **
agree .37** .28 .48** .21
Disagree -.22 .27 -.38** -.41**
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